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1 Introduction: different degrees of residential
security
Security of tenure is considered next only to food
and water in importance in urban living
(Oberlander 1985), a declaration first made at
the Habitat Conference held in Vancouver in
1976 and reiterated since then in all the Habitat
Conferences and World Urban Forums. Access to
tenured land is considered an extremely
important instrument of urban poverty
alleviation, as it addresses the issue of basic
needs. Following tenure security are the
extension of water supply and sanitation in the
informal settlements, leading to improvement in
local quality of life and, in turn, health. In the
social protection literature, access to land is
considered important for transformative social
protection in the absence of universalisation of
social protection measures, since this also
reduces deprivation. In addition, in urban areas
of developing countries, land tenure gives legal
identity to the vast majority of urban residents,
and in particular the new low-income migrants,
thereby conferring urban citizenship to them.
Access to tenured urban land leads to capital
formation among the poorest of the urban
population, something economists view as the
penetration of capitalism at the bottom of the
pyramid. Secure shelter is both status-enhancing
and of intrinsic value. The State of the World’s
Population, 2007, a report by the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), argues that the
current urban transition will not be humane if
the land needs of the poor are not met (UNFPA
2007: 3).
Having established the importance of land
tenure, what is meant by it? Payne (2000) defines
land tenure as the mode in which land is held or
owned and the set of relationships it establishes
among people concerning the land or its product.
It is different from property rights which are
defined as a recognised interest in land or
property vested in an individual or group
(Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002). In other
words, land tenure status indicates people’s level
of security in the use of land, whereas property
rights indicate its defensible legal ownership.1
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Security of tenure is determined by, on the one
hand, the constitutional rights guaranteed by a
state to its citizens and, on the other, by the legal
and administrative framework within that state.
This framework may include both customary and
statutory systems. In addition, security of tenure
can be affected by the social norms and cultural
values of a society. In sum, tenure security is a
complex entity which provides protection to a
household or individual against their involuntary
removal from their house or land without due
process of the law.
Payne (2000) has argued that there are different
levels of tenure security within the informal
housing markets, from temporary squatting to a
quasi-legal right to the land. In general, the poor
in the cities can move from informal to quasi-
legal (de facto) tenure through various processes,
and then to legal tenure (de jure) in the case of a
public policy intervention that confers property
title on them. In the absence of such a policy, the
urban poor and low-income migrants can seek to
consolidate their urban citizenship through
political citizenship in an electoral democracy,
through welfare interventions by the state and
above all, through their own subversions of urban
legalities. There are thus three categories of land
tenure status: insecure, de facto and de jure.
This process of housing mobility among low-
income settlements has been explained through
demand-side models as well as supply-side
policies. The demand-side models, coming from
economists, have linked housing mobility with
income mobility and life cycle mobility. These
demand-side models are ‘progressive housing
development’ (from Turner 1967, 1968; and
Keare and Parris 1982) and the ‘incremental
housing investment model’ conceived by Hamer
(1985). This understanding of housing mobility
has influenced the design of slum upgrading
programmes by the World Bank since the early
1970s. The argument here is that an increase in
income would lead to housing investments. The
supply side analysts and hence their proponents
have argued that access to tenured lands can also
be ensured through political action such as the
planned invasion of public lands or the large
scale supplying of small lots in periurban areas,
as President Salvador Allende attempted in
Chile in the 1970s (Edwards 1983). Hansen and
Williams (1987) have brought together the
demand-side and supply-side explanations with
policy recommendations into a ‘progressive
housing model’, which has four stages: (1) stage
zero – pre-ownership (rental housing); (2) stage
one – initial settlement; (3) stage two – self-
motivated upgrading and (4) stage three –
external-shock-motivated upgrading. The first
three stages relate to the duration of stay in the
city and the stage of people’s life cycle, whereas
the last stage relates to public policy. External
shocks in the form of public policies to do with
tenure guarantee can lead to upgrading that
consolidates low-income households in the urban
system. In short, the debate has been between
those arguing for leaving housing mobility of the
low-income households up to the market
(including policy support for those markets), and
those arguing for proactive public policy to
increase low-income housing supply, either
through building public housing or tenure
guarantee interventions.
Also, a longstanding debate regarding land
tenure for the urban poor has been whether to
guarantee secure tenure through a rights-based
approach or to confer property titles on the poor.
The market theorists have argued for the latter,
a vocal proponent of this position being
Hernando de Soto. The former would lead to
access, use, development and transfer of land
without legal ownership. However, there are
arguments against de Soto’s position. ‘Empirical
evidence points to a continuum of security in
illegal settlements that depends less on the exact
legal status and more on occupants’ perceptions
of the probability of eviction and demolition
(enforcement); as well as the availability of
services and passage of time’ (Gilbert 2001).
Payne (1997) argues that land rights are part of
other rights in a society and cannot come into
force in the absence of other rights. Thus, if land
titles are given in a society where other rights are not
present, the poor will not be able to retain them. Further,
when informal land rights are legalised by
conferring property titles, such lands become
open to outright purchase, resulting in market-
based displacements of the poor from prime
urban locations. Thus, it is safer to move
gradually toward establishing shelter rights
while avoiding pushing informal land markets
into a private property regime, particularly in
the light of currently increasing urban inequality
in developing countries. In other words, we argue
here for instruments to increase de facto, or
perceived, security of tenure.
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This study, through primary research in
Ahmedabad City,2 attempted to link a proactive
policy of extending de facto tenure security to
slum dwellers to both improvement in living
conditions and extension of social protection.
The next section briefly introduces Ahmedabad,
its policy regime and levels of tenure security
observed in Ahmedabad City. Third, a section on
methodology explains the variables chosen to
measure social protection. Next, we present the
statistical findings and the final section
concludes with observations regarding urban
public policies in India.
2 Ahmedabad’s slum development policies
Ahmedabad is the largest metropolis of Gujarat
state, India’s second most industrialised city
(Hirway and Mahadevia 2005). Today, local
conflict has segmented the city into Hindu and
Muslim areas3 (Mahadevia 2007). The city is
home to several large non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), some of which have
engaged with slum communities since 1997,
implementing an innovative development
programme called the Slum Networking
Programme (SNP).4
Ahmedabad experienced severe crises from the
late 1980s to the late 1990s during which its
main economic base, cotton textile mills, closed
down and a large section of the labour force was
displaced from the formal to the informal sector
(Mahadevia 2002). The retrenched labour
shifted to the power-loom industries, halving
workers’ wages, and to self-employment – 37 per
cent of men and 65 per cent of women were self-
employed in 1999–2000 (Mahadevia 2008a)
without any social security.
An estimated 41 per cent of the city’s population
lived in slums in 1990 (ASAG 1992). A more
recent estimate gives 26 per cent as slum-
dwellers,5 and the 2005 population census gives an
estimate of 13 per cent (Office of the Registrar
General and Census Commissioner, India 2005:
22). A primary survey of the slums by the Mahila
Housing Trust (MHT) on behalf of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) in
early 2000, states that there are around 710 slums
in the city, housing around 0.9 million people.6
In legal terms, slums can be either ‘notified’ or
‘non-notified’. The former has a quasi-legal status
and would qualify for basic services extension by
the Urban Local Body (ULB); in the case of
Ahmedabad, the AMC. The non-notified slums
may not qualify for the ULBs’ development
programmes, as these might grant residents de
facto tenure. The categories of ‘notified’ and ‘non-
notified’, ‘regularised’ and ‘non-regularised’, are
used to determine inclusion or exclusion of slums
in subsidised urban development programmes,
the notified or regularised slums being eligible.
Thus, these binaries determine the extension of
rights to the urban poor. Urbanisation is a
continuous process, so that at any time there are
large numbers of people without legal urban
residency, the poor among them living in squatter
and slum settlements.
The state of Gujarat does not have any tenure
regularisation programme, but the AMC has
various slum development programmes. These
are: (1) the 90:10 scheme where the AMC
contributes 90 per cent of the cost of household
water connection and toilet construction; (2) a No
Objection Certificate (NOC) given by the AMC
to the slums allowing individual water supply and
sewerage connections; and (3) the SNP.
Besides these, the AMC is also implementing a
public housing programme funded by the
national government under the Jawaharlal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Programme
(JNNURM). This national programme scheme
will construct 50,000 housing units for the urban
poor7 and assign them to the displaced slum
dwellers via various city-level development
programmes. The beneficiaries of this
programme are those with a proof of identity
cards, issued to slum dwellers in 1976, some
33 years ago. Duration of stay in the city
therefore becomes a criterion for extending
tenure security to slum dwellers. Those who have
lost these ID cards in one of the disasters during
this period, such as floods, conflict and fires,
would lose their eligibility. This study does not
cover residents of such public housing schemes.
The SNP has two main components: first,
improvement in physical environment,8 which
enhances promotional social protection, and
second, a community development and social
infrastructure component,9 which could assist in
transformative social protection. The entire
programme is community-driven, with local
government and the AMC in extending basic
services to the slum settlements and providing a
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ten year ‘no eviction guarantee’. The first
component extends de facto tenure security
resulting in an improvement in living conditions
and thereby reducing deprivation; in other
words, extending promotional social protection.
The second component is based on community
mobilisation, which is expected to empower the
community, resulting in transformative social
protection. So far, some 60 slums and 13,000
households have been covered under the SNP.10
The SNP therefore qualifies as a programme
extending strong de facto tenure security.
The first two slum development programmes of
the AMC extend some level of de facto tenure
security, but not to the same extent as the SNP.
Thus, these two programmes extend weak de facto
tenure security. Extension of basic services to the
slums has led to property tax bills being sent to
households there, even to those without legal
land titles, by the AMC in an effort to widen its
property tax base and increase its revenue.
Interestingly, however, this has inadvertently
extended quasi-security or de facto tenure security
to the slum households. Thus we consider receipt
of property tax bills as an indicator of weak de
facto tenure security. During our focus group
discussions with the slum dwellers, they
expressed this as their one of their central
demands to the AMC. Other measures come
under the category of citizens’ entitlements such
as getting a voter ID card and a ration card.
There are two types of ration cards, the Below
Poverty Line (BPL) card extended to those
falling below a poverty line cut-off11 and the
Above Poverty Line (APL) card. The ration card
has an address and hence gives some citizenship
rights to the holder.
The state, through its inaction, also grants some
level of tenure security. For example, if a slum
exists for a long time without its residents being
evicted it will grow, and its dwellers will
consolidate their lives in the city. The residents
use their own mechanisms to get ration cards
and voter ID cards. Many such slum settlements
in Ahmedabad have developed on private land
due to legislation such as the 1976 Urban Land
Ceiling and Regulation Act, which was
promulgated by the national government and
adopted by the state government, and stated that
lands in excess of a certain size would be
confiscated for the development of low-income
housing. This was a measure designed to prevent
monopolisation of land, in reaction to which the
private landowners subdivided their holdings and
sold them to low-income households. The private
land declared reserved for various public
purposes under the city’s development plan were
also subdivided and sold to low-income
households. In the absence of any public housing
programme or policy for low-income households,
these subdivided plots were sold quickly. These
developed into slums, so that today, more than
half of the slum households in Ahmedabad are
on private land, with any of the three tenure
security categories described above.
Lastly, there are slums in the city which lack any
of the above forms of security and may soon be
displaced. Slums of this type are those in the
‘right of the way’ of existing or proposed roads or
on lands reserved for ‘public purposes’. Slums on
public lands also come under this category since
the lands may be designated for use under the
city’s development plan. Those with a 1976 ID
card can get rehabilitation under the JNNURM
public housing, and those without it will have to
start all over again if displaced. These slums are
therefore categorised as insecure.
3 Methodology
Summarising the discussion on the slum
development policies in Ahmedabad, we can see
that tenure security is largely defined at slum
settlement level rather than at household level.
We can also see that there are four different
levels of tenure security to be found in the slums
in Ahmedabad City, defined by various actions
and inactions of the national, local (AMC) and
the state government. These are:
1 Legal housing and hence de jure tenure,
through new public housing programmes such
as the JNNURM
2 Short-term but strong de facto tenure through
the SNP
3 Weak de facto tenure security or enhanced
perceived security of tenure through:
extension of basic services as welfare
measures by the ULB, extension of
entitlements such as the Voter ID Card and a
BPL/APL Card, and administrative
instruments such as Property tax bill
4 Insecure tenure, where there is none of the
above, and where the slum is on the land
reserved for public purposes, is small in size or
new.
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Strong or weak de facto security can also be
attained through State inaction, where the slum
dwellers are left to their own devices, and over
time, muster their own personal resources,
financial and social, to attain some level of
shelter security. The key factors in this process
are inaction by the state, and duration of
residence. The longer the slum remains in the
same location, the higher the residents’
perceived level of security. The literature
suggests that the size of the settlement also
matters, particularly in electoral politics where
numbers are important. Thus, both duration of
stay and size of settlement matter for tenure
security in case there is no state policy or action.
Using this discussion, we have classified levels of
tenure security into three categories using the
variables presented in Table 1. Instead of a
statistical method of indexing or scoring, we
have used our judgement, emerging from our
discussions with the slum communities to assign
a particular tenure security category to a slum
settlement.
The authors have also carried out bivariate logit
regression analysis to observe the relationship
between each of the factors (as listed in Table 1)
constructing level of tenure security (treated as
independent variables) and dependent variables
of outcomes in social protection. Presented below
(see Table 3) are the logit regression results of
duration of stay with social protection outcomes.
The dependent variable is 1 if duration of stay is
more than 20 years and 0 if less than 20 years.
Primary survey data was collected from six slum
settlements in the Vasna ward of the city. In all,
553 samples were drawn from a total of 3,514
households. The sample covered 5,327
individuals. To identify settlements, first a list of
all the settlements in each ward was obtained
along with the data on all the basic information
of the settlement, except land tenure status.
Using the criteria of location, slum size, land
ownership, and institutions present in the
settlement, slums were shortlisted for detailed
scrutiny. Our research team visited all the
shortlisted slums to get further details of land
tenure, as defined by the criteria mentioned
above, from which six settlements were
identified in each ward. Thereafter, in each
selected slum, a community mapping was done
for the purpose of stratified sampling.
In our sample, two slums had been developed
under the SNP programme; one named
Pravinnagar-Guptanagar had an intervention by
Saath, a development NGO and another,
Jadibanagar, assisted by the MHT. Further, the
MHT has a presence in Sorainagar, the third
slum in the sample and Saath has begun forming
women’s savings groups in Mangal Talaav
Chhapra (slums on lake named Mangal). The
slums have thus seen some development
interventions by external agencies. Lastly, the
AMC has extended basic infrastructure services
to five of the six slums selected, including Mangal
Talaav Chhapra, which has been classified as
having insecurity of tenure. Yogeshwarnagar and
Shri Omnagar have not had any NGO
interventions, but the latter has basic services.
Part of Shri Omnagar is marked for eviction, as is
Mangal Talaav Chhapra. If the slums were to be
divided into three tenure categories,
Pravinnagar-Guptanagar and Jadibanagar would
classify as slums with high de facto tenure security;
Sorainagar and Shri Omnagar as having weak de
facto tenure security and Mangal Talaav Chhapra
and Yogeshwarnagar as having insecure tenure.
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Table 1 Levels of tenure security
Tenure High de facto Weak de facto Insecure
External agency intervention Yes
Land document Yes Yes
Land reservation in master plan No No Yes
Administrative instruments Yes Yes
Entitlement extension Yes Yes Yes
Extension of basic services Yes Yes Yes
Duration of stay Yes Yes Yes
4 Tenure security and social protection
The working hypothesis that guided our research
is that security of tenure facilitates access to
social protection and to improved quality of life.
In this section, we present our preliminary
findings in relation to this hypothesis. As
mentioned, this research is based on data
collected from Vasna ward, located in the south-
western part of Ahmedabad City. This was
formerly a peripheral ward lacking basic
municipal services such as water supply
networks, sewerage and drainage networks, and
waste management system. In a survey carried
out in this ward in 2005, it was found that the
availability of basic services was poor, except in
the slum where the SNP was implemented
(Mahadevia and Brar 2008). The situation has
improved significantly since then and trunk
infrastructure has been laid.
The first direct impact of improvement in tenure
status is investments by the households in
improving their shelter conditions. This
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Table 2 Social protection indicators by tenure status, Ahmedabad
Indicators Tenure (%) Average (%)
Strong Weak Insecure
de facto de facto
Housing quality – Katcha houses 32 39 54 42
Housing quality – Pucca houses 42 39 24 35
Households with individual water supply from the AMC 90 29 19 45
Households depending on public taps for water supply 4 18 52 26
Households not having access to a toilet 0 5 2 2
Households having individual toilet for the household 94 86 69 82
Households using community toilets 1 1 18 7
Males literate 81 84 72 78
Females literate 58 59 55 57
Male children going to school 72 89 81 81
Female children going to school 69 85 77 79
Average per capita income per month (Rs) 908 (Rs) 895 (Rs) 744 (Rs) 842 (Rs)
Work participation rate: male 54 50 52 52
Work participation rate: female 27 19 33 27
Male employed as casual labour 51 58 82 64
Male in private services 34 18 16 23
Male employed in social, financial and government services 2 1 0 1
Female employed as casual labour 34 41 41 39
Female in private services 53 34 48 47
Female employed in government services 1 1 0 1
Households saving 33 17 23 24
Average savings per month (Rs) 231 (Rs) 196 (Rs) 122 (Rs) 198 (Rs)
Households having ration card 85 88 73 82
Households having voter ID cards 95 95 88 92
Katcha: houses built with temporary materials in roof and walls. Pucca: houses built with permanent materials in roof
and walls.
improvement is incremental; walls constructed of
temporary materials are made permanent;
temporary roofs are made permanent and so on.
The shelter upgrading priorities in low-income
settlements are: (1) repairing a leaking roof;
(2) converting mud walls into brick walls with
cement mortar; (3) making tiling floors;
(4) connecting to water supply; (5) building
individual toilets; (6) connecting to electricity
supply; (7) extending the house and (8) buying a
new house or hut. The benefits of each of these
improvements are: (a) a water connection saves
time; (b) roof repairing saves or protects the
quality of goods, especially for home-based
producers; (c) electricity facilitates longer working
hours, which in turn increases productivity and
thus income; (d) clean drinking water reduces
illness and saves expense on healthcare and by
that makes income available for other purposes
such as education, income-generation, buying
durable assets, etc.; (e) tiled floors also improve
productivity for home-based workers; (f) brick
walls with cement mortar save recurring expenses
of repairing walls after intense rains or flooding,
and (g) house extension is useful for expanding
home-based production activities, renting out for
earning additional income and keeping the
extended family together.
The different variables indicating improvement in
shelter conditions with increase in tenure security
can be seen from the data in Table 2. To repeat,
the tenure security construct includes factors such
as duration of stay, land transaction document held
by the household if any, external intervention such
as by an NGO, state policy of extending basic
services, administrative actions and entitlement
extension. Some 54 per cent of households in the
insecure tenure category lived in katcha, or
temporary, houses where this proportion in strong
de facto tenure slums is 32 per cent. Overall, 42 per
cent of households in the slums surveyed lived in
katcha housing, indicating a great need to improve
housing conditions. Conversely, 42 per cent of
households with strong de facto tenure and just
24 per cent of households with insecure tenure had
a pucca house. Basic service availability also
improves with an improvement in tenure status:
90 per cent of households with strong de facto
tenure had access to individual water supply from
the AMC, whereas only 4 per cent of them
depended on common public taps. Conversely,
among households in the insecure tenure category,
19 per cent had individual water taps provided by
the AMC, whereas 52 per cent depended on
common public taps. In strong de facto tenure
slums, all households had access to toilets, whereas
in the insecure tenure category slums, 2 per cent,
and in the weak de facto tenure category 5 per cent,
did not have any toilet access and hence were
defecating in the open. Among the households that
had access to toilets, 94 per cent of them in the
strong de facto tenure category and 69 per cent in
the insecure tenure category had an individual
household toilet. Thus, even in insecure tenure
category households had managed to build
individual toilets through the AMC scheme. In
slums in the insecure tenure category, 18 per cent
of households used community toilets, albeit
constructed by the AMC.
The literacy rate among households with some de
facto tenure is higher than the households
without any tenure security. Male and female
literacy rates among the households living in
insecure settlements are 72 per cent and 55 per
cent, respectively, while the rates for households
living in settlements with strong de facto tenure
security are 81 per cent and 58 per cent,
respectively. We do not find any difference
between households with strong and weak tenure
security conditions as far as adult literacy is
concerned. Surprisingly, there is a higher
proportion of children going to school among
households living in insecure tenure category
than among households with strong tenure de
facto tenure security. This outcome needs to be
further investigated using variables of caste.
Male and female work participation rates do not
show any relation to tenure category, but quality
of employment does. There is a very high
incidence of casual labour work, which in India is
an unskilled, low wage activity, and hence an
indicator of poverty (Dubey and Mahadevia 2001;
Dubey and Gangopadhyay 1998). Among men,
the incidence of casual employment increases
with tenure insecurity: 82 per cent of employed
men in settlements with insecure tenure worked
as casual labour, whereas 51 per cent of men in
settlement with strong de facto tenure security did
so. In fact, the incidence of employment in
private sector services where higher skill levels
and regularity of work are required is high
among settlements with strong de facto tenure
security – 34 per cent of men and 53 per cent of
women were working in these jobs. In contrast,
just 16 per cent of men and 48 per cent of women
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in settlements with insecure tenure were
working in private services.
There is a strong positive correlation between
tenure security and income. The per capita income
of households in slums with strong de facto tenure
is Rs908, in households in slums with weak de facto
tenure is Rs895 and for households in insecure
tenure status is Rs744. With this higher income,
resulting from better employment options and an
NGO organising savings, the proportion of
households saving is highest among the slums
with strong de facto tenure (34 per cent), followed
by households living in the insecure tenure
category (23 per cent of households are saving).
Instead of the tenure factor, this NGO
intervention in savings has resulted in higher
savings incidence in insecure tenured slums as
compared with weak de facto tenure slums.
However, the amount saved depends upon per
capita incomes: the higher the per capita income,
the higher the monthly savings per household.
In our surveyed slums, about 18 per cent of
households do not have a ration card and only
19 per cent have a BPL card. The incidence of
ration cards is higher among the households with
some de facto tenure status (85 per cent and
88 per cent of households in the strong and weak
tenure categories, respectively had a ration
card), whereas 27 per cent of households in the
insecure tenure category do not have a ration
card. Thus the mis-targeting of subsidised
schemes and facilities can be seen in this survey.
However, the availability of voter ID cards is only
weakly related to tenure status, given that 92 per
cent of eligible voters had a voter ID card.
The bivariate logit regressions show that of the
different factors that constitute tenure security,
duration of residence in a slum has a very
significant role (Table 3).
The results presented in Table 3 are among those
where we could observe a significant relationship
between duration of stay of more than 20 years
and social protection outcome variables. The
duration of stay is not related to (or does not have
any impact on) the availability of water from the
urban local body, the AMC; the availability of a
toilet at household level; the participation of the
household in NGO activities; one person from the
household being a member of a community
organisation; the household’s awareness about
development programmes; the possibility of child
or children going to school; the presence of a
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Table 3 Bivariate logit results, years of stay
S. No Dependent variable B SE Z Exp (B)
1 Pucca housing 0.705* 0.258 2.737 2.024
2 More than two rooms 0.288 0.262 1.097 1.333
3 Individual toilet connection –0.046 0.307 –0.150 0.955
4 Individual bath 0.342 0.288 1.189 1.408
5 Connection to sewer line –0.278 0.368 –0.755 0.758
6 Literate 0.448* 0.238 1.886 1.565
7 Education beyond class 5 0.573* 0.237 2.419 1.773
8 Income of more than Rs3,000 0.779* 0.252 3.092 2.180
9 Household having more than six assets 0.063 0.247 0.253 1.065
10 Household saving 0.211 0.293 0.720 1.235
11 Availability of BPL card –1.098** 0.814 –1.349 0.334
12 Availability of voter card –1.732* 0.798 –2.169 0.177
13 Member of a community organisation 0.697 0.895 0.779 2.007
14 Member of a NGO –.028 0.285 –0.097 0.973
*p<0.10; **p<0.20
SE = standard error; S.No = Serial No; B = Logistic Regression Coefficient; Z = Wald; Exp (B) = Odds ratio.
sewer line in the settlement or having more than
two rooms in the house. This means that these
outcomes are influenced by other factors involved
in tenure security level. However, duration of stay
of more than 20 years in the settlement
significantly and positively impacts quality of
housing, the probability of being literate,
achieving education level beyond class 5 and
monthly household income of more than Rs3,000.
All these coefficients are significant at the 90 per
cent level. If a household is living in a settlement
for more than 20 years, then the likelihood of it
having a pucca house increases by 202 per cent;
the likelihood of being literate by 156 per cent; of
individuals in the household going beyond class 5
in education increases by 177 per cent and the
likelihood of household income being above
Rs3,000 per month, by 218 per cent.
Years of stay has a negative and significant impact
on the likelihood of holding a BPL card. This is
self-explanatory, as income increases with
duration of residence in a settlement. The
probability of a household holding a BPL card
decreases by 67 per cent if it has been in a
settlement for more than 20 years. However,
duration of stay has a negative relationship with
availability of voter cards. Thus, duration of stay is
an important component of tenure security, but
explains only certain achievements with regard to
social protection. This leaves room for community
action (in the case of Ahmedabad through an
NGO-led intervention) and for state policy.
5 Conclusions
This article presents preliminary findings from
primary research in one ward of Ahmedabad
City. This ward was located on the periphery of
the former geographic boundary of the city, and
thus had limited access to public facilities. The
city’s development in Ahmedabad, as in most
cities in India, is occurring through accretion and
not through planning and strong public policy
intervention. In recent years, in response to
economic reforms, public policy interventions in
cities have led to displacements, creating
vulnerabilities and pushing the poorest out of the
city (Mahadevia 2008b).
This article shows that the lives of the urban poor
improve incrementally, through their own efforts.
Duration of stay plays an important role in
improving quality of life and social protection.
However, when these efforts are supported by a
state policy of extending de facto tenure,
improvement can be faster. Gujarat’s policy has
been ‘poor left to their own devices till the trickle
down benefits reach them’, in that tenure, security
is attained through non-intervention by the state.
This works until the state becomes proactive in the
promotion of economic growth, as has occurred in
India since the early 1990s. The first phase of
development since economic reforms has been a
story of displacements and marginalisations in
urban areas, and in the metropolitan cities in
particular, mainly because there has been inaction
on the part of the state in protecting the poor, and
active support for the urban infrastructure
development that has caused displacements.
In such a scenario of state non-action, given
Ahmedabad’s history of voluntary organisations,
NGOs have intervened to facilitate improvement
in quality of life and to enable people to obtain
their entitlements. NGO intervention has also
hastened incremental improvements in quality
of life. Some proactive state intervention such as
extension of basic services also has similar
effects to NGO intervention. The combined
effect of non-intervention (measured through
duration of stay), NGO intervention and state
policy is captured by the tenure status variable.
This paper argues that in the absence of either
land policy or slum policy extending secure tenure
to the slum dwellers, perceived security of tenure
has mattered. This perceived security of tenure,
or what we call de facto tenure, emerges from many
factors rather than a single public action, and
improvements in quality of life and achievements
in social protection are outcomes of a combination
of factors involved in tenure security.
Improvement in physical quality of life and hence,
reduction in deprivations are strongly linked: the
higher the degree of de facto tenure security of a
slum settlement, the higher is the residents’
physical quality of life. Incomes and savings are
also related to tenure levels and so is quality of
employment. However, the incidence of savings is
related to other institutional interventions such as
NGO programmes. The literacy rate and the
incidence of children going to school is not related
to tenure status (as defined by aggregating all the
defining factors). It is possible that literacy and
education status are influenced by some of the
factors defining aggregate tenure, and therefore a
disaggregated analysis would help to explore a
possible relationship.
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Notes
* Acknowledgements are due to Ms Bijal Bhatt
of MHT, Rajendra Joshi of Saath, Niraj Jani of
Urban Resource Centre of Saath for assisting in
data collection, Pooja Shah for data collection
and Pavan Ankinpalli for statistical analysis.
1 Within the context of ‘Eminent Domain’ of
the state.
2 This study is part of a larger study carried out
in two locations in Ahmedabad City and one
location in Surat city. The findings presented
here are from one location in Ahmedabad
City.
3 The city’s polity has taken a communal turn
from mid-1980s, bringing the first Hindu
right-wing political party to power at the city
level since the late 1980s and at the state level
from mid-1990s. The period of mid-1980s to
the beginning of this century saw spate of
communal violence in the city resulting in
segregation of the Hindu and Muslim
population (Mahadevia 2007b). Very few
wards in the city therefore have mixed
communities. Vasna ward, selected for the
survey reported in this article, is on the
boundary of the Hindu ward and the adjoining
ward is a Muslim population dominated ward.
There is a road in between, which was called a
‘border’ during the 2002 communal violence
engineered by the Hindu right-wing forces.
These communal divisions and city-managed
infrastructure often have implications for
public policy implementation. For the purpose
of this article and its hypothesis, we have not
gone into any details of this dimension of
public space in Ahmedabad City however.
4 For details of SNP, see Acharya and Parikh
(2002); Joshi (2002); Dutta (2002).
5 The 1998 slum estimate is from the Swarna
Jayanti Shehri Rojgar Yojana (SJSRY) survey;
the 2001 estimate is from the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation (AMC) as given in
Ahmedabad’s CDP (http://jnnurm.nic.in/
missioncities.htm).
6 The number of households in a slum was
calculated through a survey conducted by
SEWA and SAATH. The total slum population
has been calculated considering a family size
of five. As per census figures of 2001, a
population of 439,843 reside in slums. This
figure has not been considered as it includes
only those slums which have clusters of more
than 60 houses.
7 As per the presentation by the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation at a National
Workshop on Approaches to Lands for the Urban
Poor in India, organised by the Ministry of
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation,
Government of India and CEPT University,
Ahmedabad, 17 April 2009.
8 This component contains the following seven
facilities: (1) water supply to individual
households; (2) sewerage to individual
households; (3) individual toilets; (4) roads
and paving; (5) storm water drainage;
(6) street lighting and (7) tree plantation.
9 This component consists of formation of
neighbourhood groups, women’s groups
(Mahila Mandal) and youth groups (Yuvak
Mandal), with the active involvement of
NGO(s) involved.
10 Based on data obtained from MHT and Saath,
both NGOs implementing the SNP in
Ahmedabad.
11 Indicators spanning level of living,
employment category and asset possession, are
used to get a composite index of household
level achievements. A cut-off is decided and
households below this cut-off are defined as
Below Poverty Line (BPL) households.
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